Weather and climate forecasters are now in the business of communicating seasonal climate forecasts to decision-makers. While it seems clear that these forecasts carry a great many potential benefits, it also appears possible that conveying too much information about the forecasts could have the potential to harm people. Based on theories from behavioral economics, we argue that many people are likely to overestimate the potential dangers of forecasts, and to err on the side of communicating too little information. We support this argument with evidence gathered over the last three years in Zimbabwe, in a project designed to help subsistence farmers understand and use seasonal rainfall forecasts.
Introduction
Seasonal climate forecasts based on El Niño have the potential to help million of people. By knowing with a greater degree of accuracy what weather the coming year may bring, people can plan ahead. Seasonal rainfall forecasts can allow farmers to plant more appropriate varieties of seeds, food security officials to prepare for potential food shortfalls, water managers either conserve or make power, as appropriate. Responding to this potential for putting information to use, multiple organizations have started working together to produce and apply useful seasonal climate forecasts.
The best example of this response is in the annual series of Regional Climate Outlook Forums, an effort initiated by the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Office of Global Programs (NOAA-OGP) in cooperation with food security organizations (numerous early warning systems) and national meteorological offices. The first of these was the Southern African Regional Climate Outlook Forum (SARCOF), and has been taking place annually since 1997. National meteorological offices in many of the countries in the region have established close linkages with the World Meteorological Organization sponsored Drought Monitoring Centre. In Zimbabwe, the national Department of Meteorological Services has become a model of successful networking building between climatologists from around the world, the food security early warning system, and the national media. Meteorologists appear regularly on the radio to discuss the forecasts for the season, and the office commands a high degree of respect.
Seasonal forecasts can also hurt people, especially farmers. If there is a forecast of drought, banks have a history of restraining credit for farming inputs, so that even drought tolerant crops become impossible to grow. Farmers sometimes misunderstand the forecast, and make misguided decisions on the basis of what they erroneously believe (Patt. 2001) . In some cases, other market players may be able to take advantage of forecasts more, and even though all learn about the coming weather, some people will lose out (Broad. 1999) . In a year of apparent forecast error, the forecasters themselves will be among the very visible losers. When they are perceived to have been wrong, they are criticized publicly, their news are proclaimed as not trustworthy, and their advice is less likely to be considered in the future. One example of this occurred in 1997-98, when climatologists warned strongly, or were perceived as warning strongly, of a drought that largely failed to materialize (Patt. In Press) .
It is possible, therefore, that forecasters may be reluctant to share information, especially when they are not entirely confident in it. We find limited empirical support for this proposition, noticeable against a strong backdrop of forthright communication. In the most recent SARCOF meeting, taking place in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 2002, we observed climatologists deliberately issuing an extremely cautious forecast, one that appeared-at least to us-to err on the side of providing too little information. At the time of the SARCOF, El Niño was possibly growing, possibly shrinking, in the tropical Pacific Ocean. Interestingly, most of the statistical models showed very little influence of this El Niño on rainfall in the region, and predicted a high probability of normal conditions. Much would depend, however, on whether El Niño would recede, or would continue to grow, and that was still difficult to predict. This was an interesting year, full of a great deal of uncertainty. The climate forecast that was issued for much of southern Africa, however, told a much more limited story. It called for probabilities of below normal rainfall slightly greater than usual, citing El Niño as a reason. It did not, however, discuss the possibility that El Niño would either continue to grow-in which case the forecast would likely change to one predicting a greater chance of drought-or recedein which case the forecast would move toward climatology.
As participants in this SARCOF meeting, we were puzzled by this apparent caution on the part of forecasters, a reluctance to reveal publicly all of their information. This paper is our attempt to understand that caution and, more generally, to explore the possible behavior of forecasters and users with regards to seasonal climate information. Our own discipline, behavioral economics, offers several related theories that suggest s a nonrational bias toward caution, and we draw upon these to explain what we observed. Following with behavioral economics, and drawing from our fieldwork, we further suggest that this caution may not be entirely justified, and may in fact be counterproductive. We expect that our arguments in this paper, or even our characterization of forecasters as cautious, may come under criticism. Hopefully, at least, this paper will generate healthy discussion about the appropriate amount of caution in the process of making information useful for society.
Theoretical background: behavioral economics
Several related theories of decision-making are relevant to this question. In this section we begin with the economic paradigm of rationality, i.e. maximization within constraints. We then present an overview of alternative models of decision under uncertainty stemming from the growing discipline of behavioral economics, which investigates and attempts to explain a wide range of phenomena that the rational model considers anomalous. At the core of behavioral economics is the recognition that the constraints on choice include our limited ability to process information as problem solvers, resulting in predictable and widespread anomalies relative to what would constitute an optimal outcome. Bounded rationality, prospect theory, omission bias, and status quo bias will be discussed, highlighting how they relate to the application of climate forecasts.
Rational model of decision making
Traditionally, economics has been committed to addressing the results of choice rather than the process of choice (Simon. 1988) . For standard economic thought, a "rational" decision is a decision that maximizes expected utility. The rational man of economics will not accept any choice different from the best choice, and the best choice is defined solely in terms of the final outcome (McFadden 1999) . In other words, given a set of possible outcomes, any decision-maker can rank these outcomes in order of preference and will always choose the one at the top of the list, regardless of the initial situation or of how different alternatives are presented.
This model of decision making is both descriptive and normative: Not only does it claim to explain how we actually behave, but it also suggests that any other form of behavior is undesirable because it results in a less-than-optimal outcome. As Laibson and Zeckhauser (1998, p.7) put it, this model implies that 'in the absence of externalities, maximizing individual actions generate an efficient outcome for society as a whole'. Camus (1951) argued that man is not smart enough to be rational, and the literature in behavioral economics proves his point. The economist's rational man is a stranger in the complex real world that we inhabit. Nonetheless, as scientists concerned with the responsible use of knowledge, it is still appropriate for us to pursue the core of the normative spirit of the rational model: It is desirable to maximize the expected value of decision making -particularly when it can affect the life and death of millions.
Bounded rationality, heuristics, and biases

Albert
While the rational man of economics is supposed to compare the expected utilities of all the options available to him at any given time and pick only the best one in all instances, it is evident that a functional rationality needs to be less rigid and demanding than traditional economists would expect. During the 1950s, Herbert Simon set the foundations for the developments in theory of choice arguing that all rational behavior is behavior within constraints, including our limitations in computational capabilities, information management and problem solving. We develop decision procedures that are reasonable. Instead of optimizing all the time, we do in fact 'satisfice': we define a set of lower limits of acceptability for the result of certain decisions, and adopt an available option that satisfies that criteria. This model of behavior implies that people do not change decisions at the margins of improvement, as implied by the rational model.
Simon's concept of bounded rationality (Simon. 1955 ) triggered work by psychologists into consistent procedural patterns, rather than outcome patterns, of decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman. 1974) . Heuristics, or simplified procedures for decisionmaking, are based on judgments about the likelihood of uncertain events. Essentially, people use a standard set of sub-routines for estimating probabilities-associating events with perceived similar events, searching memory for the most visible examples, and attaching a great deal of confidence in these estimates (Tversky and Kahneman. 1973) . These procedures prove acceptable most of the time, but they may lead to sub-optimal choices in a variety of situations (Rabin. 1998) (Patt and Zeckhauser. 2002) . Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979) collected comprehensive empirical evidence suggesting that the economic rationality associated with expected utility theory is systematically violated, and that under certain circumstances, decision-making errors can be not only expected, but also predicted. The foundation of what they label "prospect theory" is the experimental evidence that changes in perspective may change the relative desirability of options. In particular, framing a risky decision in terms of losses can yield different results than if the problem is framed in terms of gains. This contradicts a basic principle of rational choice: the assumption that if one option is better than the other then it should always be the preferred one under those conditions.
Prospect theory and loss aversion
Several framing experiments focused on manipulations that switch two identical scenarios from the 'gain' frame to the 'loss' frame, resulting in a rejection of the rational model's assumption that choices are determine solely by contrasting final outcomes. The following example illustrates this discrepancy with an experiment in which over 300 subjects faced a hypothetical situation presented in two versions (extracted from Tversky and Kahneman 1988) .
Scenario 1: An unusual disease is expected to outbreak in the US and kill 600 people. Two alternative programs are proposed to combat the disease. The exact scientific estimates of each program are as follows:
• If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
• If program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Scenario 2: Same situation as above, but the estimates are presented as follows:
• If program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
• If program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.
Programs C and D are framed in negative terms (lives lost), but they correspond exactly to programs A and B: respondents face the choice between a certain survival of 200 people or a 1/3 chance of all 600 people surviving. The effect of this change in framing is striking. In Scenario 1, 72% of the subjects preferred choice A. In Scenario 2, only 22% chose program C, while 78% opted for program D.
Kahneman and Tversky proposed a "value function" that captures anomalies like the one presented above, quite different from economists' standard utility function. A typical value function, shown in Figure 1 , illustrates the difference in subjective valuations of gains and losses relative to a neutral reference point. The curvature of the function indicates that both for gains and for losses, the effect of a marginal change decreases with distance from the reference point.
One important feature of this value function is the change in slopes at the origin: the response to losses is more extreme than the response to gains. This is usually called loss aversion, and reflects the observation that the displeasure of loosing a unit of a certain good exceeds the pleasure of gaining the same quantity. As a result, changes in framing can modify the perception of the reference point, and therefore have an influence in the preferred choice for a given decision problem. Importantly, prospect theory attempts solely to explain preferences, whether they can be rationalized or not. It diverges from the rational model not just in predicting different types of choices but also in 'being unabashedly descriptive and in making no normative claims' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1988) .
Omission bias
Decision makers like to steer clear of involvement where losses are inevitable. Additionally, people often evaluate a decision to commit an action (a commission) more negatively than a decision to omit an action (an omission) when both have the same negative consequences. Omission bias is a preference for greater losses arising though errors of omission over smaller losses associated with a direct act (Spranca et al, 1991) . This contradicts the rational model, which proposes that outcomes are the only basis for comparing the utility of different options. Patt and Zeckhauser (2000) argue that 'gains and losses with and without a personal stamp prove not to be equivalent'. This is highly relevant for our study: If a drought fails to be forecasted, the personal stamp of losses is charged on those who communicated the information, whereas the stamp of gains would most likely be shared with those users who adopted the forecast -. Experiments described by Kordes-de Vaal (1996, p.169) suggest that the source of the omission bias is a difference in perceived causality-the outcome of an omission appears less intended than the outcome of a commission. Alternatively, several commentators agree with Sudgen (1982, 1986) in giving consideration to the role that anticipated emotions play in decision making, arguing that this bias is associated with the desire to avoid regret. Ritov and Baron (1995) demonstrated that 'the bias toward omission is greater when potential regret is present, and potential regret is greater when knowledge of outcomes is expected'. Baron and Spranca (1997) then discuss what they call "protected values", or values that people think should not be traded off (i.e. they have infinite value). They propose that such values result from deontological rules concerning actions rather than outcomes. This can be observed in most religious systems: they forbid acts that result in death, but do not condemn failing to act for preventing a death. Ritov and Baron (1999) presented evidence that protected values show stronger omission bias than do other values.
The evidence for omission bias in decision-making is abundant. Yet it could be argued that, with time, omissions in the context of seasonal climate forecasting will be regretted. There appears to be a temporal pattern to the experience of regret following bad decisions. Gilovich and Medvec (1995) show that errors of commission generate more regret in the short term; yet errors of omission produce more regret in the long run. They suggest that time trims down the sting of regrettable actions while intensifying the sorrow of regrettable inactions. This statement is supported by the work carried on by Feldman, Miyamoto and Loftus (1999) , which asked people to describe their deepest regrets, and found that inactions are reported more than actions. Zeelenberg et al (2002) suggests that, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction than to action. These findings do not contradict the omission bias, but they give another reason to try take it into consideration and try to reduce its influence in decision making: If we don't start using good forecasts when they're available, not only will we produce less food in the long run. We will also regret it.
Status quo bias
In many situations it may be perfectly reasonable to exhibit a preference for not modifying the existing state of affairs. Yet there is evidence that some decisions that favor the status quo violate the tenets of the rational model. A series of decision-making experiments developed by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) showed that individuals disproportionately favor the status quo. They designed a questionnaire in which they controlled for preferences and held constant the set of choices, but varied the framing of the alternatives: a neutral framing presented the menu of options with no labels attached, and a status quo framing, in which one of the alternatives was placed in the status quo position and all others were presented as alternatives to the status quo. Paralleling the experimental results obtained from tests addressing the loss aversion elements of prospect theory, their experiment showed a predictable and significant status quo bias. People tend to overweight potential negative outcomes, therefore preventing implementation of reasonable change. It is important to highlight that the gain/loss framing is entirely absent in some of the problems presented to subjects, indicating the presence of status quo bias as a general experimental finding that is compatible with loss aversion but is not prompted solely by it.
Status quo bias can be stimulated by the tendency for losses to loom larger than gains, the low salience of opportunity costs in decision making, and by blame-avoidance. Ritov and Baron (1992) observed that preferences for status quo could be at least partly caused by a bias toward omissions. Like in the case of omission bias, avoidance of decision regret has been identified as an important element contributing to status quo bias. Tetlock and Boettger (1994) demonstrated that, when change creates victims, accountability amplifies the status quo effect even when many more lives could be saved by implementing change. In their study, they asked subjects to play the role of a regulatory decision maker facing different scenarios involving the choice of accepting or rejecting a drug that could save people but also could kill or seriously injure a relatively smaller amount of people. Their experiment yielded interesting results: Lives lost from inaction were considered less valuable than lives lost from changing the status quo. In a scenario where subjects were accountable for modifying the existing state of affairs, the ratio approached 9:1. They concluded that status quo bias could be increased by political accountability demands that induce decision makers to avoid acting in ways that elicit anger and blaming from well-defined constituencies. They explain the highly replicable interaction of accountability, status quo bias and ratios between deaths due to errors of commission and those caused by errors of omission as the product of mutually reinforcing cognitive and political accountability pressures.
One can expect accountable decision makers to be less enthusiastic about embracing the seasonal climate forecasts. When discussing situations in which it would be desirable for society at large to change the status quo, Tetlock and Boettger propose that subjects are likely to look for ways to delay making the decision to implement change, or to diffuse responsibility for the decision. The model developed by Janis and Mann (1977) on conflict and decision making proposes two coping mechanisms for facing this situation: procrastination (requesting additional time to make the decision in the hope that more decisive evidence would later be at hand) and 'buckpassing' (referring the decision to somebody else). These response strategies are not easy to justify politically or psychologically, because they result in allowing more people to die than to live. The reluctance to take the decision can be justified with the pretext of extreme caution or by claiming moral concerns.
Caution and Seasonal Climate Forecasting
The findings associated with behavioral economic theories pose significant challenges in the face of emerging tools that have the potential to improve decision-making. For example, status quo bias has enormous implications for sustainable development.
Because it favors adherence to preexisting norms, it results in 'routine behavior at the expense of innovation' (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988, p. 38) . In particular, status quo bias diminishes the receptivity of new sources of information, resulting in a significant obstacle to the transition to better allocational decisions. There are many other concepts of behavioral economics not discussed above that may negatively affect the adoption of improved forecasts. For example, according to the availability heuristic: (judging probabilities based on the ease with which instances can be brought to mind) decision makers will find it much easier to recall the deaths associated with a drought in Africa than to bring to mind the deaths indirectly caused by a prolonged and systematic food shortage that could be reduced with the use of seasonal climate forecasts.
Sources of Forecasting Caution
As the previous sections attempted to describe, errors of commission are much more dreaded than errors of omission, leading to a bias towards inaction. The costs associated with inaction in the context of seasonal climate forecasts (i.e. the welfare loss resulting from efficient decisions not taken) are not easy to identify or measure, but can undoubtedly be considerable.
An example of options to deal with biases can be adapted from Crowe and Higgins (1997) . They compared strategic inclinations in two framing studies addressing what they call a 'promotion focus' (concerned with advancement, growth and accomplishment) and a 'prevention focus' (concerned with security and responsibility). They hypothesized that individuals in a promotion focus insure against errors of omission, perform better on difficult tasks, and generate more distinct alternatives, whereas those in a prevention focus insure against errors of commission and quit more readily. The results of their experiment supported these predictions. This implies that institutional arrangements which stimulate a promotion focus would result in reduced influence of biases diverging decision makers from rational options; among other advantages. This can be relevant for the creation of agencies and plans pertaining the generation and distribution of seasonal climate forecasts.
Many organizations that could reap gains from this type of information have yet to establish routines or responsibilities for processing it. The performance of organizations, from the family hut in rural Zimbabwe to the global institutes dealing with climate prediction, depends on how they cope with a wide array of challenges. As pointed out by the National Research Council (Stern and Easterling 1999) , organizations must reach an agreed interpretation of available information, specify tasks, roles, responsibilities and relationships between tasks, develop appropriate lines of communication, and have access to sufficient resources to act appropriately. Each of these elements of organizational performance is subject to the biases presented above, and there may be ways to minimize their negative influence.
While discussing the ongoing tradition in applied communication research that focuses on the diffusion and adoption of technologies, Walter (1992, p.34) argues that 'more often than not, barriers to technological diffusion have proven to be infrastructural or social rather than informational: capital and product market structures, technology attributes, local traditions and household goals frequently inhibit technology adoption more than lack of knowledge about a technology or how to use it' (emphasis added). Bounded rationality is likely to manifest itself in planting decisions: without certainty that a rainy season will be good, farmers may prefer not to change their traditionally riskaverse strategy to change decisions at the margins of improvement. Ultimately, it is indispensable to identify to which extent there are cognitive limitations that constrain actors, to be aware of the factors that bias risk judgments in a predictable way and, in short, 'to realize the potential of being educable' (Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein 1982, p.489) .
Costs and Benefits of Caution
We argue that governments, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations may be too cautious in providing climate information to users. This caution is of course born out of a desire not to harm anybody by providing too much information, but may also be magnified both by organizational incentives and by behavioral biases. The organizational incentives take the form of punishment for provision of information that proves inaccurate, together with a failure either to punish the failure to provide insufficient information, or the rewarding for information that proves accurate and useful. This system of incentives not only discourages risk-taking behavior, but defines as risk the possible costs of providing information, rather than the possible costs of not providing it.
The behavioral bias works in much the same way. As the literature demonstrates, people greatly prefer to make errors of omission to making errors of commission.
When do scientists provide too little information, and what are the consequences? If there is information that would cause decision-makers to make different and better decisions, and they withhold that information, then they are guilty of providing to little information. The consequences are both immediate and long term. In terms of immediate harm, decision-makers will have failed to make the best decision, and with results that are worse than they otherwise could have been. This is obvious. Less obvious are the longterm consequences. Every time decision-makers make new decisions, based on additional information, they learn. First, they learn about how to incorporate information into their decision-making processes in the first place, to be creative. Second, they learn what the results of those new decisions are. For example, a particular farmer might plant a different variety of seed in response to a climate forecast, a variety she had not previously tried. Not only would she possibly get better yields in this season from the seed, but she would learn additional information both about the new seed's performance, and about how one can best take care of the plants through to harvest. Arguably these learning costs are much greater than the short-term costs to not having the additional information.
If scientists provide information that might be misinterpreted, causing decision-makers to change their decisions in an adverse way, then they are providing too much informationor conveying it the inappropriately. The consequences are again both immediate and long term. The immediate costs are that the decisions taken will be harmful. The long term cost, again the more significant, is that the decision-makers' trust in the scientists will decline. Thus, the next time that the scientists offer information, the decision-makers will be more likely to ignore it.
How much information scientists should provide, then, depends on the relative risks associated with providing too much versus too little information. This in turn depends on answers to the following questions:
• How likely are decision-makers to misinterpret the information?
• How likely are decision-makers to make different decisions based on their interpretation of the information? • How able are decision-makers to learn from their successes and failures?
• How readily will decision-makers' trust in scientists decline following the transmission of poor information?
Evidence from Zimbabwe
To begin to answer these questions, we turn to observations made during an extended field project, examining the use of information and trust in scientists among subsistence farmers. This research project revolves around a series of annual "forecasting workshops" held in four villages in Zimbabwe, beginning in September 2000, and continuing through at least 2005. We chose these four locations-Tiya, Mahkwe, Mkoko, and Mafa as shown in Figure 2 -to represent a cross-section of the agro-meteorological conditions found in Zimbabwe.
We designed the workshops explicitly to test the benefits of providing more, rather than less, information. They occur as soon as possible after the September SARCOF meeting, typically the third or fourth week of September. This is sufficiently far in advance of the planting season-usually mid-October through December-to allow farmers to use the information gleaned in the forecasting workshops to purchase different farming inputs, especially different varieties of seeds. While we organize and facilitate the workshop, we also count on the local agricultural extension officer, as well as local leadersschoolteachers, village chiefs, village elders-to participate actively and share their knowledge. Between forty and sixty farmers-a mix of men and women-attend each workshop. The workshops last most of a day, and give participants an opportunity to learn and ask questions about not only the official scientific forecast, but also background information (such as what El Niño actually is), sources of uncertainties in the forecast, and how the forecast compares with the village leaders' interpretation of local and traditional indicators. As facilitators, we do not make specific recommendations for how the participants can use the information, but do encourage them to think actively and collectively about possible response strategies.
Beginning in April, 2003, we will follow up each workshop with a structured survey instrument, administered to both to workshop attendees and others who did not attend the workshop, from neighboring villages. These will allow us to gauge how useful the workshops actually were, in terms of the decisions made throughout the season. However, even though we have not yet conducted these rounds of surveys, we have valuable information, collected during the workshops themselves, which can help answer the fundamental questions raised in this section. We address these questions in turn, matching each one with observations from the prior three years' workshops.
How likely are decision-makers to misinterpret information?
Not very likely. In our workshops, we presented information about the local climate, El Niño and the ways in which it affects weather in southern Africa, and the forecast for the coming season. Our biggest fear was that workshop attendees would over-react to the information we presented, so we deliberately made sure to reveal all of the uncertainties in the forecasts. This began by discussing the SARCOF forecasts in their probabilistic sense, using the tercile likelihoods for above normal, near normal, and below normal rainfall. To communicate these, we drew pie charts showing the different likelihoods, with a different color associated with each amount of rainfall. In the first two years of the workshops, we had participants spin an arrow on the pie chart, to observe how the number of times the arrow pointed to a particular color was proportional to the area of that color on the chart. To make the probabilities useful, we asked people to list the last ten years in terms of how much rain had fallen. Then, we could label each year as whether it had fallen into the "above normal", "about normal", or "below normal" category.
Did people understand this information, and appreciate the meaning of uncertainty? We offer several pieces of evidence that they did. By the third year in each of the workshop locations, several people asked early on what the probabilities for different amounts of rain were. They showed an appreciation that we could not tell them whether it would definitely be a "good" or "bad" year, but that we could tell them probabilities associated with different amounts of rain.
Second, people's understanding of their local indicators matches this appreciation for probabilistic information. In all of the workshop locations, people described their local indicators-flowering plants, insects, winds-as offering clues to the coming season, but in no way certainty. Thus, understanding a probabilistic scientific forecast is probably not difficult.
Third, the questions that people asked typically revealed an understanding of the information. For example, after a discussion of El Niño, the fact that it is an ocean current that influences weather patterns in many parts of the world, people asked such questions as: "What causes the water temperature to be warmer one year, and then colder the next?", "What impacts does El Niño have on the weather in South America, where it is closest too?", and "Can El Niño have an impact on cyclones, the ones that come from the Indian Ocean to Zimbabwe?" We suggest that these questions at least reveal that people are paying attention, understanding the concept of probabilistic drivers of weather.
Fourth, in the most recent round of the workshop, we increased the level of complexity by discussing conditional and joint probabilities. The occasion was an uncertainty, in September 2002, about whether El Niño would weaken or strengthen in the coming months, and thus how it would affect Zimbabwe. Because of this uncertainty, the SARCOF forecast itself was not far from climatology, and hence conveyed very little information. However, discussion with climatologists revealed that better information about El Niño would be forthcoming, likely by October or November, and this in turn could lead to higher skilled forecasts. To communicate this concept at the workshops, we began with a familiar example of choice under uncertainty: betting on a soccer game. We suggested that the national teams from Zimbabwe and Argentina would be facing each other in a game, that we had heard that one of the star players was injured, but that we were not sure whether it was Argentina's Diego Maradona or Zimbabwe's star, Peter Ndlovu. Clearly, the likely winner would depend on which player was injured. We polled people in the workshop who they thought would win in each case. Most said Argentina, but in the case of Maradona injured many people thought Zimbabwe had a better than even chance of winning. We thus suggested the following conditional probabilities: 80/20 Argentina if Maradona plays, and 60/40 Zimbabwe if Ndlovu plays. We then asked the workshop participants to develop the overall probabilities for either Argentina or Zimbabwe winning. Volunteers in the room did the math, and assigned the probabilities of 60/40 Argentina to the entire event tree, as seen in Figure 3 . From there, we suggested that the climate forecast in Zimbabwe was not dissimilar: we simply did not know yet what role El Niño would play. We portrayed two realistic forecasts, depending on whether El Niño were to grow or to diminish, and suggested the probability of each was 50%, as also shown in Figure 3 . We then asked workshop participants to do the math, and develop our present forecast. In each workshop location, they were able to do this. Clearly, the workshop participants were able to think about the probabilistic forecasts in complex enough terms to be able to combine two possible forecasts into a single one.
There were of course a few counterexamples, showing people's failure to understand the forecasts. In the second year of the project, one of the workshop participants discussed what he had learned from the previous year. The pie chart we had shown had very little yellow on it, representing a low likelihood of dry conditions. He said that this turned out to be the case during the season -he had seen very few yellow flowers. But this example was by far the exception, and not the rule. In general, workshop participants appeared to pay close attention, to ask useful questions, and to comprehend the information presented, especially the probabilistic character of the forecasts. The fact that people do a good job of understanding forecast information, as long as it is well presented, makes it less likely that people will "over-react" to information, and makes it less likely that they will suffer from having been provided with "too much" information.
How likely are decision-makers to make different decisions based on their interpretation of the information?
Not very likely. We began the workshops in 2000 somewhat worried that people would make rash decisions based on the forecasts, that these decisions would harm some of them, and that they would suffer as a result of our actions. In the first year, our anxiety was heightened, as people told us that they found the information "very useful." Perhaps it would be too useful. By the second and third years of the project, however, our fears faded, as we realized that not a single person had made a single decision that could be overly costly, should the forecast have turned out to be wrong. A few people had purchased a little bit extra of one kind of seed or another in response to the forecast, but nobody had had gone so far as to change varieties on even a single entire field. This should come as no surprise. The farmers themselves are likely to experience the same behavioral decision-making biases as the forecasters, in terms of preferring errors of omission to errors of commission. If they are to make a mistake, they would rather it be in terms of doing too little in response to the forecasts, instead of too much. At all locations, we asked workshop participants whether they would change their decisions in response to a forecast that indicated a very high likelihood of either heavy rain or draught. They indicated that they would change their decisions from the usual, but they would have to be very certain in the information, more certain indeed than they are from the local or traditional indicators. They reasoned that if they were not sure what would happen, it was better to stick to what they know. The fact that farmers are operating within a family could add to this: family members might blame them if they tried something different and it did not work out. So they may try very small changes, but not such large ones that they would look irresponsible if they relied too much on a forecast that turned out to be wrong.
The conservatism of farmers lowers the likelihood that they will suffer from "too much" information, but it also lowers the benefits of having received just enough information. As long as the information is provided in a way that is understandable, and reveals the uncertainties present in the information, forecasters should not fear that farmers would make risky and unwise new choices. At the same time, forecasters should not expect too many positive results from providing well-communicated forecasts, at least not quickly. Assuming that farmers would use the new information to the maximum possible benefit would be wrong: farmers will under-use the new information.
How able are decision-makers to learn from their successes and failures?
There is no reason to believe that farmers are not able to learn from their successes and failures. At each workshop, each of the three years, the participants expressed enthusiasm to learn something about the climate, and how they could make better decisions using the information. In the second and third years of the workshops, we were surprised to find that many of the farmers who had attended the previous year's workshops remembered the previous year's forecast perfectly, as well as the previous year's local indicators. As to the latter, we were able to check their recollection or the indicators with what we had recorded at the workshop, and found the match to be perfect.
Clearly, farmers were paying attention to the weather, and to information. Also interesting was that many of the farmers had kept precise logs of the rainfall during the season. While they had not had the opportunity to measure rainfall precisely, they had noted the days when rain had fallen, and whether it was light, medium, or heavy. Walking through a field in the second year of the project, we were surprised to find a homemade rain gauge, constructed out of a tin can. The farmer explained that he had decided, after the workshop, to keep better records, and it would be useful to be able to measure the rainfall in millimeters. Farmers also kept detailed records of how each field had faired, and had a good knowledge of which seeds performed best in their areas.They appeared willing and able to learn, and to do everything in their power to boost their yields. This supports the argument for providing more information, rather than less. Farmers need the opportunity to compare outcomes from year to year, and to compare forecasts with actual rainfall from year to year. Over time, they can only grow wiser.
How readily will decision-makers' trust in scientists decline following the transmission of poor information?
Surprisingly, farmers' trust in scientists appears to fall slowly, despite the oft-repeated saying that trust is hard to win and easy to lose. In our opinion, what destroys trust is not so much being wrong, as being dishonest. As long as forecasters do their best to transmit all of the information they know-and crucially the uncertainty associated with what they know-farmers are likely to 'forgive them' if the weather does not turn out exactly as forecasted. This resembles the trust they have in their local indicators; at all workshop locations, the participants said that they trusted the indicators, even though they realized that often the indicators were wrong, having witnessed them be incorrect in the past.
In both the first and second year of the project, the SARCOF forecast for Zimbabwe was relatively positive, with high probabilities of normal to above normal rainfall. In both years, the least likely outcomes was below normal rainfall, standing at 25%. Unfortunately, in neither year did the rain fall in a very productive manner, and in the second year it was altogether lacking. In 2000-2001, the first year of the project, the rains started well, but then a dry spell of almost a month persisted during January. While the farmers in the wetter two villages, Tiya and Mahkwe, reported that their crops mostly survived, in the drier two places most farmers lost a significant portion of their harvest. The rain which fell in February and March was sufficient to bring the year back to about normal rainfall totals, but the harvest was far from normal. In 2001-2002, there was again a dry spell in the middle of the growing season, but this time it last much longer: through both January and February. The rain that fell in March was too little and too late. In the drier areas, the farmers had almost no harvest at all. In the wetter areas, they were able to harvest some grain, but very little.
Did this have a negative impact on farmers' view of the forecast, or of the scientists? Not really. Farmers noted that we had provided them with a forecast that indicated that dry conditions were entirely possible, even if not likely. They didn't think that the forecast was entirely wrong, just not particularly helpful (of the 146 farmers surveyed, 52 described the previous scientific forecats as 'accurate and helpful'; 54 said it had been 'accurate but not helpful', and just 19 thought it was eirther 'not accurate' or 'dead wrong, and misleading'). By contrast, many of them had heard the forecast on the radio, which in both years had predicted a good season, absent any discussion of uncertainty. This forecast, they said, had been wrong, and they were less inclined to trust what was said to them over the radio. The forecast presented during the workshops, however, was still to be trusted, precisely because it conveyed information about its own limitations. Indeed, in one of the workshop locations, Mkoka, the village chief made a particular point of inviting more people to the workshop during the third year of the project, even after the poor performance of the forecast the previous year. He invited his peers from six surrounding villages to come, in a sense staking his reputation on the value they would find in the forecasting workshop. Had he decided that the forecast was wrong, and not to be trusted, it is unlikely that he would have invited more people to attend. Likewise, in the other three sites, the attendance in the third year of the project was the highest yet. If people were mistrustful of the forecast, they certainly did not show it by their actions.
Conclusion
There are good reasons for forecasters to be cautious in presenting information about seasonal climate forecasts. Most importantly, they should try to avoid presenting information that appears more certain than it actually is. At the same time, there are good reasons to expect forecasters to be too cautious. We have presented several theories from behavioral economics, based on experimental results. We then discussed the conditions under which the dangers from presenting too much information would be minimized. We showed, based on our experiences in an ongoing research project in Zimbabwe, how these conditions appear to be met.
